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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

David M. Estes
Plaintiff/ Appellant

)
)

V.

)

LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO.1, JOY RAPP, in her
capacity as Superintendent of Lewiston
School District No. 1, Sherri Allen, Brad
Rice, Dan Rudolph, Brenda Forge, Bill
Davis, collectively as the Board of
Trustees of the Lewiston independent
School District No. 1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants / Respondents

SUPREME COURT NO. 39469-2011

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
NEZPERCE

HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

Bentley G. Stromberg
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13 th St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendants
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David M. Estes
Appellant Pro Se
1308 10th Ave.
Lewiston, ID 83501
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This dispute involves the plaintiff and the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1,
which was organized on December 30th 1880 by the 11 th Territorial Legislature. At issue is when
should a school board election be held and when should a winning candidate be sworn in to the
board of trustees of the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1.
The appellant, David Estes, filed suit when the school district held an election and failed
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to seat a candidate under the charter granted to the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1
as amended in 1959 or under a current state election law.
The appellant, David Estes, filed for summary judgment on the issue on June 1J1h 2011 in
the Nez Perce County District Court. The issue was heard by the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick.
On 21 October 2011, Judge Kerrick, issued a memorandum of opinion and order on the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment in which the Judge denied the appellants motion for
Summary judgment based on a lack of standing and mootness. This appeal results from that
ruling.

ISSUES
1. Did the court err by ruling that the appellant did not have standing to bring suit?
2. Did the court err by ruling that the case was moot:

ARGUMENT
Did the court err by ruling that the appellant did not have standing to bring this suit?
In 2011 the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1, put a bond on the March 8

th

election cycle. A group of Lewiston citizens formed a group called Taxpayers Against Unfair
Taxation to fight the school bond. At an election held on March 8th 2011 the school bond was
defeated.
The appellant, David Estes, was the campaign manager during the first election. One
Dale D. Yochum was the chairman of TAUT.
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Following the March 2011 election, TAUT, decided to run Dale D. Yochum for the
School board. That election was held on the 1?1h day of May 2011. Mr. Yochum was elected to
the school board. (CP 5) During the Yochum campaign, David Estes, was again the campaign
manager. ( CP 5)
After the May 2011 election, Dale Yochum was not immediately seated on the School
Board. David Estes questioned the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1 Superintendent
Joy Rapp on when Mr. Yochum would be seated. He was told by Superintendent Rapp that
Yochum would be seated on or about the 13 th Day of July 2011. (CP 7)
In examining the state statutes, the Lewiston Independent School District Charter (1937)
and the Lewiston Independent School District Local Rules it was plain that the statutes and rules
th

conflicted. ( CP 6-7) As far as seating Mr. Yochum on the School Board on the 13 Day of July
2011 that date was well past the date to seat Mr. Yochum. (CP 7) under any of the statutes or
rules.
After the election, the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1 began to pass
Resolutions without the input of Mr. Yochum, The school district hired an assistant
superintendent, renewed the contract for Dr. Joy Rapp and dealt with the resignation of
Five teachers.
In the case of the renewal of the contract of the school superintendent, the board
held a meeting at a private residence belonging to a board member in violation of the Open
Meetings Act to discuss the renewal of the contract. (CP 5)

It became obvious that the School District was using the time between the date Yochum
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Was to be sworn in to further the board's agenda without opposition. There was no way to stop
The board from their actions but it was felt that any future such actions could be mitigated if the
School Board was compelled to follow the proper election procedure as set forth in its charter. A
suit was filed to resolve the issue of which law should be followed to seat an incumbent school
board trustee. (CP 4-26)
Following the service of the complaint and answer received, the appellant moved for
summary judgment. ( CP 31-207 ) The defendants filed their own summary judgment asking the
court to dismiss the case based on standing and mootness. ( CP 208-209 )
On October 21 st 2011, Judge Carl Kerrick issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment ( CP 224-233)
In the October 21 st 2011 order, Judge Kerrick addressed two main questions. ( CP 224233 ) One was the issue of standing and the second was the issue of mootness.
The court based its ruling on whether the appellant had suffered any personal harm as
Opposed to harm to the public in general. ( CP at 228) Though the appellant argued that the
Standing issue did not apply to him because he was not a part of the general population but part
of an elected class of individuals that is he was a resident and elector within the school district
boundaries and not a part of the general population as a whole that still did not preclude his
rights under the public rights doctrine. In fact the argument presented by the appellant was a
reflection of that legal concept. ( CP 35)
Both Ohio and California courts have addressed the issue of the public rights doctrine.
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In Ohio, the Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward
86 Ohio St. 3rd 451:
" ... Ordinarily a person is not authorized to attack the constitutionality of a stature,
where his private rights have suffered no interference or impairment, but
as a matter of public policy a citizen does have such an interest in his government
as to give him capacity to maintain a proper action to enforce the performance of
a public duty affecting himself and citizens generally.
The court explained that "[w] here a public right, as distinguished from a purely
private right, is involved, a citizen need not show any special interest therein, but
he may maintain a proper action predicated on his citizenship relation to such
public right. This doctrine has been steadily adhered to by this court over the
years." (Citation omitted)
The court in Sheward supra went on to rule:
' .. We hold therefore, that where the object of an action in mandamus and/or
prohibition is to procure the enforcement or protection a public right, the relator
need not show any legal or special individual interest in the result, it being
sufficient that relator is an Ohio citizen and, as such, interested in the execution of
the laws of this state."
California courts have observed the public rights doctrine as well. In Waste Management
v. County of Alameda, 93 Cal Rptr. 2d 740, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1223 the court ruled:
"The matter of a citizen's action is a long established exception to the requirement
of a personal beneficial interest. The exception applies where the question is one of public right
and the object of the action is to enforce a public duty in which case it is sufficient that the
plaintiff be interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the public duty enforce.
( Citations omitted )
In Idaho the courts have recognized the public right doctrine. In Miles v. Idaho
Power Company, 116 Idaho 635, 778 Pacific 2d 757 (1979) the court wrote:
" ... To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many
others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
government actions could be questioned by nobody. Quoting United States v
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. SCRAP, 412 US 669, 687-688, 93 S.Ct. 2405,2416." (CP 35)
This is not a case where there is some tangible economic interest at stake. It is a case of
the right to take part in the electorial process and to have your voice heard in matters of
government. It is a mandamus and declaratory action asking the court to rule on which election
law applies to the Lewiston Independent School District No. 1 and directing the Lewiston
Independent School District No.1 to comply with the appropriate statute. As such, the appellant
has the right to bring suit under the public right doctrine and the court should recognize that
right.

Did the court err by ruling that the case was moot?
The court in its memorandum opinion ruled on the issue of whether the suit was moot
since Dale Yochum had been seated by the school board. At CP 229, the memorandum opinion
read, "The plaintiff asserts the pending lawsuit seeks two avenues of relief: a writ requiring the
school district to swear Mr. Yochum in as a trustee, and an order declaring that the board
improperly applied state election laws and procedures." That is not an accurate statement.
No where in the pleadings can you find any request to seat Mr. Yochum. In his motion
for summary judgment the appellant plainly wrote that the purpose of the suit was to settle the
issue of when a school board candidate should be seated. ( CP 31-32) Nor did the appellant's
verified complaint mention any such relief asking that Mr. Yochum be seated. ( CP 8)
Before the court, the appellant brought to the attention of the court that he did not make
any such request to have Mr. Yochum seated and challenged the defendant's attorney to show in
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the pleadings where such a request was made.( TR 13-14)
Mr. Stromberg, Attorney for the defendants, acknowledged in the end that the issue was
about a declaratory relief and plainly stated it was not about anything else. ( TR 18-19) Yet the
court persisted in ruling that the issue was moot because Mr. Yochum was sworn in. ( CP229 )

It appears the court took the summary judgment ( CP 208-209, 221-223) submitted by
Mr. Stromberg and made a ruling based on that pleading and ignored the arguments and
pleadings submitted to the court. The appellant cannot submit any pleading on the mootness
issue because there is no legal theory to defend. The issue doesn't exist.

CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in its ruling on two counts. First it ruled that the appellant
did not have standing to bring this suit. The Public Rights Doctrine plainly reads that a
person who is a citizen and is not directly affected by a government action or inaction can
still bring suit under a mandamus action to compel the government to perform a duty or not
perform a duty. That is the purpose of the suit before the court. As such, the appellant has
standing to bring the suit.
In addition, the District Court ruled on a claim of mootness that does not exist. The
Appellant never asked that a candidate named Yochum be seated. The failure to seat Yochum
was the set of facts that gave rise to the suit. There was nothing more to the factual evidence.
That ruling of mootness should be overturned by the Appellate Court.

ATTORNEY FEES FOR APPELLANT
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Attorney fees do not apply to the appellant. He is prose. Nor does the appellant seek any
reimbursement fees.
Dated this 24th Day of May 2011.

David M. Estes, Appellant pro se
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